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TRUMP’S TWITTER TENSION: IS SOCIAL




The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Knight First Amendment Insti-
tute at Columbia University, Inc. v. Trump answered the question of whether
now former President Donald Trump’s blocking of Twitter users from his
profile was a violation of the public’s First Amendment rights.1 The court
upheld the Southern District of New York’s conclusion that President Trump
engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination by “blocking” them
from his social media account because he disagreed with their speech.2 The
courts both agreed that President Trump was using his account to “conduct
official business” and, therefore, blocking individuals amounted to viewpoint
discrimination.3 The Second Circuit’s decision was petitioned for a rehearing
en banc that was denied, but the decision was not unanimous and included a
dissent.4
The rise of social media has created a highly interactive space for peo-
ple across the world to access and interact with news contemporarily. It has
also forged a space for politicians on both sides of the aisle to update the
public on their stances and express their views.5 While this advancement has
allowed the public to participate more directly with their elected officials, it
is creating questions regarding the scope of the public’s First Amendment
rights to interact in this forum.
This Casenote addresses the following: (1) a brief discussion on how
Twitter works; (2) an overview of relevant First Amendment law; (3) an
overview of the Southern District of New York’s decision; (4) an overview
of the Second Circuit’s rehearing en banc majority and dissenting opinions;
(5) an analysis of why the courts’ holdings are correct and additional reasons
that support the outcome; and (6) a conclusion discussing potential conse-
quences of the decision. This Casenote concludes that the Second Circuit
* Caylee Phillips is a second-year law student at SMU Dedman School of Law.
She attended Oklahoma State University and graduated with a degree in chemi-
cal engineering.
1. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d
Cir. 2019) (Second Circuit’s original decision regarding this case).
2. Id.; Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
549 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
3. Knight, 928 F.3d at 230.
4. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216, 217 (2d
Cir. 2020) (Second Circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc).
5. See Dawn Carla Nunziato, From Town Square to Twittersphere: The Public
Forum Doctrine Goes Digital, 25 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2019).
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Court of Appeals was right in determining that the President’s “blocking” of
users from his Twitter account violated the First Amendment because the
interactive space of his tweets is a public forum.6 Additionally, the outcome
of the court of appeal’s decision is correct because there are certain freedoms
that government employees must give up when taking office, and the use of
their social media in an official capacity might just be a modern extension of
traditional restrictions. This Casenote will also attempt to explore the ramifi-
cations for politicians’ social media use in the future and the potential liabili-
ties they could now face considering this decision.
II. THE BASICS OF TWITTER
To understand the nuances of this set of decisions, it is important to
understand how Twitter works. Twitter is a social media platform with over
70 million active users in the United States alone.7 All users have a unique
username that follows an “@” sign, which is called the user’s “handle.”8
Each tweet can only have a maximum of 280 characters.9
Once a message has been tweeted, there are a variety of ways that other
users can interact with the tweet.10 A user can “retweet” a tweet, which is
essentially reposting the tweet to one’s own timeline.11 A user can “like”
someone’s tweet by clicking the heart that appears beneath each tweet.12
Both of these functions are seen as signs that the user agrees with or enjoys
your tweet.13 A person can also “reply” to a tweet.14 The reply will show up
on both the replying user’s own timeline and underneath the original tweet.15
A string of replies to a single tweet is known as a “comment thread.”16 If one
were to click on a specific tweet, all the replies would be displayed below
this tweet.17 The interface that displays a specific tweet with all of the replies
6. Knight, 953 F.3d at 217.
7. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
8. Id.
9. How to Use Twitter: Critical Tips for New Users, WIRED (Aug. 29, 2018, 5:25 ,
https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-setup-twitter-search-hashtag-and-login-
help/.
10. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 550.
11. Twitter for Beginners: The Complete Guide, WIX BLOG (Oct. 24, 2016), https:/
/www.wix.com/blog/2016/10/twitter-guide-for-beginners/.
12. See Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 551.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 550.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 551.
17. Id.
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beneath it is referred to in the courts’ decisions as the “interactive space.”18
The interactive space is essentially the medium for users to interact with the
content of a user’s tweets.19
Users can “follow” other accounts to see all tweets posted or retweeted
by that specific account.20 Users can also “block” or “mute” other accounts
that they do not wish to see or interact with.21 “Blocking” an account prohib-
its that user from seeing your tweets, following your account, or replying to
your tweets.22 In contrast, “muting” allows one to remove tweets from a user
from their own timeline without unfollowing or blocking them.23 Muted ac-
counts do not know that you have muted them, and they can be unmuted at
any time.24 Additionally, if you do not follow a muted account, you will not
receive any notifications about that account, but that account will still be able
to see and reply to your tweets.25
III. FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
Each of the courts involved in the Knight First Amendment Institute at
Columbia University v. Trump case began their analysis by deciding whether
the First Amendment protects the interest the blocked users were seeking to
redress—the right to interact freely with their elected official.26 The first is-
sue is to determine whether the First Amendment protects the speech in ques-
tion.27 The First Amendment protects citizens engaging in political speech; in
fact, political speech “fall[s] within the core of First Amendment protec-
tion.”28 The only instances of political speech that would not be protected
18. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 551.
21. About Being Blocked, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/some-
one-blocked-me-on-twitter (last visited June 28, 2021); How to Mute Accounts
on Twitter, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-mute (last
visited on June 28, 2021).
22. About Being Blocked, supra note 21.
23. How to Mute Accounts on Twitter, supra note 21.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216,
218–19 (2d Cir. 2020); Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump,
928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019); Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v.
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
27. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985).
28. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008).
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would be a limited class of speech that involves obscenities, defamation,
fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.29
A. Public Forum Doctrine
The Public Forum Doctrine is a subset of the First Amendment that
protects individuals from government censorship in places designated as pub-
lic forums.30 A public forum is a space owned or controlled by the govern-
ment.31 A space may be a public forum based on government control even
absent legal ownership of the forum.32 Government property is defined in
three categories: (1) traditional public fora; (2) limited and unlimited desig-
nated public fora; and (3) all remaining public property.33 Traditional public
fora are places that have consistently been a place for free expression and
assembly—like parks and streets.34 This forum has the most protection be-
cause the government is extremely limited in their ability to discriminate
against the viewpoint or content of speech in these areas.35 A designated
public forum is a forum that the government intentionally opened for the
purpose of becoming a public forum.36 The government has wide discretion
in the establishment of this type of forum, but once it has been established as
a forum, “any content-based restrictions must be narrowly tailored to achieve
a compelling government interest.”37 Additionally, the speaker must have
their access to the forum diminished to seek First Amendment protection.38
The analysis of a public forum should focus on the access sought by the
speaker to determine the scope of the public forum.39
29. Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 131 (2011).
30. Nunziato, supra note 5, at 20–21.
31. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
32. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661,
679 (2010).
33. Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Shackled Speech: How President Trump’s
Treatment of the Press and the Citizen-Critic Undermines the Central Meaning
of the First Amendment, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311, 331 (2019).
34. Nick Reade, Is There A Right to Tweet at Your President?, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1473, 1478 (2020).
35. Id.
36. Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009).
37. Reade, supra note 34, at 1479.
38. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 565
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
39. Id.
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B. Government Speech Doctrine
Another subset of the First Amendment is the Government Speech Doc-
trine.40 The First Amendment restricts the government’s regulation of private
speech but does not restrict the regulation of the government’s own speech.41
The government cannot restrict private speech based on viewpoint or content
discrimination. However, the government is not engaging in viewpoint dis-
crimination when it decides the content of its own speech at the exclusion of
other viewpoints.42 Courts look to three factors when determining whether
speech is government speech or private speech: (1) “whether the government
has historically used the speech in question to convey state messages”; (2)
“whether the speech is often closely identified in the public mind with the
government”; and (3) “the extent to which the government maintains direct
control over the messages conveyed.”43
IV. KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY V. TRUMP
A. District Court Decision
The Southern District of New York held that the interactive space of
President Trump’s Twitter account was considered a public forum; therefore,
President Trump cannot block people from the account based on their con-
trary political views because this would be considered viewpoint discrimina-
tion.44 The court started the analysis by determining that the access the
plaintiffs sought was very limited—they did not seek access to the account as
a whole.45 Instead, the court analyzed the content of the tweets, the comment
threads initiated by those tweets, and “the interactive space associated with
each tweet.”46
President Trump set up his Twitter account in 2009 as a private account,
but upon running for and subsequently winning the presidency, the account
served as a “channel for communicating and interacting with the public about
his administration.”47 The profile of the Twitter account was registered to
“Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States.”48 The court found that
the account was government controlled because President Trump and his so-
cial media director, Daniel Scavino, controlled the content of the tweets and
40. Day & Weatherby, supra note 33, at 329.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 336.
44. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549.
45. Id. at 566.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 552.
48. Id.
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had the ability to prevent other accounts from viewing the tweets by block-
ing.49 Additionally, the control was governmental because the tweets were
being preserved under the Presidential Records Act, and the account was
being used to appoint, remove, and announce executive officers—actions
that can only be taken by the President.50 Even though the account was origi-
nally set up as a private one, the proper analysis would be to analyze the
forum as it existed at the time, which was as a means of communicating and
interacting with the public as the President of the United States.51 The control
the President had over the account did not extend to the comment thread, as
President Trump did not have control over who replied to the tweets or the
content of those replies.52 He only had direct control over the content of his
own tweets and who has access to the interactive space associated with the
account.53
In contrast, the court held that the content of the tweets was considered
government speech and therefore not subject to the forum analysis.54 The
record proved that President Trump used the account to “defend his policies;
to promote legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to engage with
foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; and to challenge media or-
ganizations whose coverage of his Administration he believed to be unfair.”55
However, the interactive space was not held to be government speech be-
cause the replies were associated with the private citizen who owned that
account and not President Trump himself.56 Additionally, the primary pur-
pose of tweeting is “to allow speakers to engage with the content of the
tweet.”57 The court noted that when an individual is blocked, their ability to
directly interact with the tweets is thwarted.58
After determining that the interactive space of President Trump’s Twit-
ter was subject to forum analysis, the court concluded that it was a non-
traditional forum because there has been no historical practice of using this
type of forum.59 President Trump is one of the first politicians that has used
social media, not only as a platform for his presidential campaign, but also as
a means to directly interact with the American public instead of using more
49. Id. at 566.
50. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 567.
51. Id. at 569.
52. Id. at 569–70.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 571.
55. Id.
56. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 572.
57. Id. at 573.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 574.
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traditional means such as news outlets or press conferences.60 Further, the
court held that President Trump intended to make his Twitter account’s inter-
active space a public forum because it was generally accessible to the public
at large (as long as you are not blocked), and anyone who wanted to follow
the account could do so.61 The interactivity of Twitter is “one of its defining
characters” and “accommodates a substantial body of expressive activity.”62
Lastly, the court considered specifically the blocking of individual users
from the Twitter account.63 Restriction of a public forum is only acceptable if
it achieves a “compelling government interest,” but viewpoint discrimination
is not permissible in any public forum.64 In this case, the users were blocked
immediately after expressing views that were critical of the President’s poli-
cies or critical of him.65 While the President has his own First Amendment
rights that include the ability to not engage with the individuals, the court
held that the blocking of the users went beyond this right, as he could simply
mute or ignore them.66 The President retains the right to not listen, to not
respond, and even to amplify the voice of one individual over the others.67
The court concluded that President Trump was merely permitted to mute
individuals from his Twitter, not block them, because this would remove
their tweets from his view but still allow the individual users to see, respond,
and interact with his tweets.68
B. Second Circuit’s Denial of Rehearing En Banc
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding.69 The Second
Circuit held that a court must look at how the official “describes and uses the
account; to whom the features will be made available; and how others, in-
cluding government officials and agencies, regard and treat the account”
when determining if an account from a politician will be subject to forum
analysis.70 The decision was appealed and denied for a rehearing en banc, but
there was a dissenting opinion that argued that the court had misapplied what
60. See id. at 552–53.
61. Id. at 574.




66. Id. at 577.
67. Id. at 576.
68. Knight, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 576.
69. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d
Cir. 2019).
70. Id. at 236.
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constituted a state action.71 The dissent concluded that the First Amendment
does not include a right to post on other people’s social media accounts—
even those accounts held by government officials.72 Instead, the dissent ar-
gued that the court failed to continue the analysis of what constitutes a state
action by failing to consider “whether the President exercised some right or
privilege created by the State” when blocking users from his Twitter
account.73
The dissent considered that Twitter is privately owned and controlled,
meaning that the use of features on the app would “involve no exercise of
state authority.”74 President Trump was able to block users before he became
President, so he “exercised no special powers possessed by virtue of law,”
nor “were his actions made possible only because he was clothed in the au-
thority of the law.”75 The dissent worried that if the use of personal accounts
to tweet about their work in office were made state actions, then government
officials would be inhibited from “discussing public matters on their personal
accounts without converting all activity on those accounts into state
action.”76
The dissent also argued that the analysis should not have been con-
ducted on the entire account, but that the court should have considered
whether the actual action of blocking users amounted to state action.77 Prece-
dent of the court showed that they should “look to the nature of the officer’s
actions, not simply his duty status,” and by taking a broader approach, all of
an official’s social media account turned into state action when only some of
it was being used in that way.78 There was also the consequence of creating
confusion of when the account specifically turned into state action or what it
would take to turn a personal account into a government official’s account.79
Turning to the First Amendment analysis, the dissent found that the
court had misapplied precedents of the public forum analysis to the interac-
tive space of the account.80 First, the dissent argued that any time government
71. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 953 F.3d 216, 217 (2d
Cir. 2020).
72. Id. at 226 (Park, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 227 (Park, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (quoting Colombo v. O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (per
curiam)).
76. Id.
77. Knight, 953 F.3d at 227–28 (Park, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 228 (Park, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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speech is involved, it is not subject to forum analysis.81 It also noted that
even Twitter does not make a distinction between the actual tweets and the
interaction space, so this distinction by the majority was arbitrary.82 Second,
the dissent argued that President Trump did not intend to create a public
forum by continuing to use the account the same way he did before taking
office because “the government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse.”83 The court’s dissent ended their discussion
by concluding that this decision would create uncertainty in the use of social
media for all levels of government officials.84
While the dissent made interesting points of contention, the majority’s
analysis properly disavowed these arguments. First, the majority held that
President Trump was exercising a “right or privilege created by the state” by
blocking users on Twitter because of the nature of the tweets.85 For example,
when President Trump tweeted about foreign policy, he was speaking as the
Nation’s Chief Executive and the Commander in Chief.86 This is precisely a
“right or privilege” created by the state, and the majority emphasizes that if
this was not considered such a privilege, “it would be hard to imagine what
might be.”87 Additionally, the majority clarified that even though the block-
ing feature was available to all users, the issue was not the mere fact that
President Trump blocked users, but that he blocked users from an official
account.88 The fact that every user is able to use this feature does not by itself
make it a private action.89
Second, the majority also contended that the line between what are ac-
tions by public officials and what is purely personal is not as blurred as the
dissent contended.90 The majority reaffirmed the discussion the court of ap-
peals analyzed in their first opinion—that the control President Trump and
his staff used over the account and the use of the account as an “official
channel of communication” was the reason it was considered an action by a
public figure.91 While this is true, the majority’s test might not have been as
clear-cut as they intended and will be discussed further below.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 229 (Park, J., dissenting).
83. Knight, 953 F.3d at 228 (Park, J., dissenting) (quoting Perry v. McDonald, 280
F.3d 159, 167 (2d Cir. 2001)).
84. Id. at 230 (Park, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 219.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 220.
89. Knight, 953 F.3d at 220.
90. Id. at 219.
91. Id. at 219–20.
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Lastly, turning to the First Amendment analysis, the majority held that it
was not straying from traditional forum analysis by drawing a distinction
between the content of the tweets themselves and the interactive space of the
account.92 The court drew an analogy to traditional public fora: when public
officials hold a town hall meeting, statements made by the public officials are
protected by the government speech doctrine; however, when the public is
allowed to comment, the officials may not prohibit certain people from en-
gaging in that discussion.93 Significantly, the court held that even if the ac-
count was not considered a public forum, “excluding individuals who express
disfavored viewpoints is not permitted.”94
V. POLITICIANS WHO USE THEIR SOCIAL MEDIA
ACCOUNTS AS AN EXTENSION OF THEIR OFFICE
SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO RESTRICTIONS
The Second Circuit and Southern District of New York reached the right
result in finding that blocking users based solely on contrary viewpoint dis-
crimination was a violation of the First Amendment when that social media
account is deemed to be a public forum.95 However, the courts could have
constructed a clearer standard. The Second Circuit established a multifactor
test to use in determining whether any account by a politician will be subject
to forum analysis.96 While the court listed factors to consider, these factors
were given little rationale.97 The court merely stated it is informative “how
the official describes and uses the account; to whom the features will be
made available; and how others, including government officials and agen-
cies, regard and treat the account.”98
But President Trump’s use of his Twitter account has been an unprece-
dented approach to how politicians communicate with the public, especially
considering the position he had—the President of the United States.99 While
the court’s multifactor test might be easy to apply in this case—where the
tweets concerned the appointment of executive officers, announced major
92. Id. at 220.
93. Id. at 221.
94. Id. at 223.
95. Knight, 953 F.3d at 218–19; Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v.
Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).




99. Tamara Keith, Commander-in-Tweet: Trump’s Social Media Use and Presi-
dential Media Avoidance, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 18, 2016, 3:46 PM), https:/
/www.npr.org/2016/11/18/502306687/commander-in-tweet-trumps-social-me-
dia-use-and-presidential-media-avoidance.
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political news and foreign policy, and are considered preserved under the
Presidential Records Act—the next case discussing a politician’s social me-
dia may not be as straightforward.100 The sparse rationale for this standard
makes future litigation for public officials uncertain; therefore, the standard
for what politicians should strive for in their social media use for personal
accounts is also unclear. The court did not establish a clear-cut continuum of
when an account crosses the line, and it is likely that President Trump’s use
of social media was far more active and garners much more national atten-
tion than most politicians’ tweets would.101 The court muddies the middle
ground by not expanding on these factors, especially considering the only
example of the application of these factors happens to be one that is
extreme.102
Despite the potential uncertainty this decision has created, the courts
reached the right result because there are certain freedoms that public figures
must give up when deciding to take office, and this might just be a modern
extension of those sacrifices. For example, the government can restrict the
speech of their employees when their speech affects the operation of the gov-
ernment.103 Thus, government employees do not receive the full protection of
the First Amendment.104 The ability to restrict the speech is not absolute; if
the speech is considered a matter of public concern or the employee is speak-
ing as a private citizen (not pursuant to official job duties), the government
may not filter the speech.105 Speech is a matter of public concern when it
relates to “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”106
Another example where government employees give up some of their
freedom by taking a government position is the Hatch Act.107 Under this Act,
federal employees are forbidden from “tak[ing] an active part in political
management or political campaigns.”108 The Supreme Court has affirmed this
limitation by emphasizing that the government has a substantial interest in
forbidding partisan political activities, and these interests outweigh the rights
100. See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541,
552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
101. See Knight, 928 F.3d at 236.
102. See id.
103. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1983).
104. Id. at 156–57.
105. Id. at 157.
106. Snyder v. Phelps, 56 U.S. 443, 453 (2011).
107. See Particular Government Regulations that Restrict Expression, JUSTIA
(Sept. 30, 2020), https://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-01/13-par-
ticular-governmental-regulations.html.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 7323(b)(2) (2008).
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of employees to participate in political activities even though this restriction
impairs some First Amendment rights.109
Presumably, government employees must expect some limitations on
the scope of their rights when the interests of the public at large are at stake.
In this situation, the interest at stake is the right of free exchange of ideas, a
fundamental right with immense historical significance in our country.110 The
Supreme Court identified, early in its precedent, that the First Amendment
requires “an environment that promotes robust public discussion and limits
the power of the government to silence opposition.”111 President Trump’s
blocking of users solely based on the fact that they had views different from
his own hindered the “robust public discussion” that the Supreme Court has
long recognized as protected under the First Amendment.112 President
Trump’s Twitter account produced public discussion every day in the inter-
active space of his tweets, and allowing all users equal access to participate
in this discussion is vital to the free exchange of ideas.113
However, President Trump was not left without any options to censor
his Twitter account. He could still “mute” users without violating their con-
stitutional rights because a muted user can still see and interact with the
tweets, but the user does not have to see or interact with any of the muted
user’s tweets.114 Trump was also free to simply ignore the users who had
contrary views, and he was even permitted to promote users with views simi-
lar to his own over users with contrary views.115 The narrow restriction the
court was seeking to enforce was only to allow users the ability to access and
reply to the President’s tweets for as long as he was President of the United
States, since this account had become an extension of the office.116
Additionally, it is important to note that this is not a political issue—this
restriction affects politicians from both sides of the aisle and from varying
levels of government.117 In 2017, a Virginia court held that the Loudoun
County Board of Supervisor’s Chair, Randall Phyllis, could not block Brian
Davison from the Facebook page she set up for her position just because he
109. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616–17 (1973).
110. Day & Weatherby, supra note 33, at 323.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 231
(2d Cir. 2019); Day & Weatherby, supra note 33, at 346.
114. Knight First Amend. Inst. at Colum. Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
115. Id. at 576.
116. Id. at 566.
117. See Davison v. Loudoun Cty. of Bd. Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 723–24
(E.D. Va. 2017).
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made a comment with which she disagreed.118 In July 2019, Twitter users
similarly sued Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez for blocking them
from her Twitter account; she eventually settled the lawsuit and issued a
public apology.119 Both of these cases dealt with public figures from posi-
tions in a different level of government than President Trump, but the result
was the same. Courts are not going to enforce this limitation just against
those in the highest levels of government.120
VI. CONCLUSION—WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS
DECISION?
Twitter is the new “town hall” of public forums and has created the
ultimate interactive space for constituents to engage with their elected offi-
cials.121 In a world of rapidly evolving technology, the law must also evolve
to protect the public’s fundamental right of free exchange of ideas that is
essential to a democracy. Social media appears to only be getting more in-
volved with our lives, so it will become even more vital for the Supreme
Court to take this case on appeal to clarify some of the ambiguity that politi-
cians now face.122
After Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v.
Trump, it appears the politicians could be subject to the public forum analysis
if they use their account in any way that could be considered an extension of
their office—tweeting about their own public policies, putting their official
position in the biography of their account profile, conversing with other pub-
lic officials veiled with their current position, or announcing matters related
to official government business.123 The most conservative option would be
for public figures to make their personal accounts private and create a sepa-
rate account solely for their public position. In this way, they will not have to
worry about what actions may cross the line as their personal and public
spheres of life will be separate.
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